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ABSTRACT
Currently used wireless communication technologies suffer security weaknesses that can be
exploited allowing to eavesdrop or to spoof network communication. In this paper, we present
a practical tool that can automate the attack on wireless security. The developed package
called wifimitm provides functionality for the automation of MitM attacks in the wireless
environment. The package combines several existing tools and attack strategies to bypass
the wireless security mechanisms, such as WEP, WPA, and WPS. The presented tool can
be integrated into a solution for automated penetration testing. Also, a popularization of
the fact that such attacks can be easily automated should raise public awareness about the
state of wireless security.
Keywords: Man-in-the-Middle attack, accessing secured wireless networks, password cracking, dictionary personalization, tampering network topology, impersonation, phishing

1.

INTRODUCTION

Recent enhancements to wireless technology
strengthen the benefits of wireless communication. It is convenient to access the network from any location within the network
coverage area. For most of the portable devices, this is the only way to connect to the
network. Installation and network setup are
easy, and the network is further expandable.
The main benefit of Wi-Fi, its accessibility,
makes this technology a suitable target of attacks. A potential attacker needs to be in the
physical proximity of a Wi-Fi network. The
1

This paper is an extended version of the original
paper that has been presented at the 9th EAI International Conference on Digital Forensics and Cyber
Crime (Vondráček, Pluskal, & Ryšavý, 2018).

c 2018 ADFSL

proposed wireless security standards aim at
prevention of such unauthorized access. Unfortunately, the first standard called WEP is
so weak that it is possible to crack the password in a few seconds using a conventional
laptop computer. The answer was the introduction of stronger standard WPA and later
even stronger WPA2. In 2017, Mathy Vanhoef announced that he discovered a vulnerability in security mechanisms that use the
four-way handshake (WPA and WPA2) and
demonstrated how easily this vulnerability
can be exploited.
The main focus of this paper is security
of wireless networks. It provides a study of
widely used network technologies and mechanisms of wireless security. Analyzed techPage 59
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nologies and security algorithms suffer weaknesses that can be exploited to perform Manin-the-Middle attacks. A successful realization of this kind of attack allows not only
to eavesdrop on all the victim’s network
traffic but also to spoof his communication
(Prowell, Kraus, & Borkin, 2010, pp. 101–
120; Callegati, Cerroni, & Ramilli, 2009).
In an example scenario (Figure 1), the
victim is a suspect conducting illegal activity on a target network. The attacker is
a law-enforcement agency investigator with
appropriate legal authorization to intercept
the suspect’s communication and to perform
a direct attack on the network. In some
cases, the suspect may be aware that his
communication can be intercepted by the Internet Service Provider and harden his network. For example, he could use an overlay network technology, e.g., VPN (implemented by L2TP, IPsec (Kent & Seo, 2005,
pp. 09–10), PPTP ) or anonymization networks (Tor, I2P, etc.) to create an encrypted
tunnel configured on his gateway, for all
his external communication. This concept
is easy to implement and does not require
any additional configuration on endpoint devices. Generally, this would not be considered a properly secured network (Godber
& Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 425-431), but this
scheme, or similar, is often used by large vendors like Cisco (Deal & Cisco Systems, 2006)
or Microsoft (Thomas, 2017) for branch office deployment and can also be seen in home
routers1 . In such cases, intercepting traffic
on the ISP level would not yield meaningful results, because all the communication is
encrypted by the hardening. On the other
hand, direct attack on the suspect’s LAN
will intercept plain communication. But,
even when an investigator is legally permitted to carry out such an attack to acquire
1

Asus RT-AC5300 – Merlin WRT has an option
to tunnel all traffic thought Tor.
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evidence, it is scarcely used, because it requires expert domain knowledge. Thus, this
process of evidence collection is very expensive and human resource demanding.
Internet

ISP

AP

Suspect

Investigator

Figure 1. Example forensics scenario where
the suspect has hardened his network and
uses an encrypted tunnel from the gateway (AP ).
The aim of this research is to design, implement and test a tool able to automate
the process of accessing a secured WLAN
and to perform data interception. Furthermore, this tool should be able to tamper with
the network to collect more evidence by redirecting traffic to place itself in the middle
of the communication and tamper with it,
to access otherwise encrypted data in plain
form. Using the automated tool should not
require any expert knowledge from the investigator.
We designed a generic framework, see Figure 3, capable of accessing and acquiring
evidence from a wireless network regardless
of used security mechanisms. This framework can be split into several steps. First,
c 2018 ADFSL

Automated Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against . . .

it is necessary for an investigator to obtain access to the WLAN used by the suspect. Therefore, this research focuses on
exploitable weaknesses of particular security mechanisms, see Section 2 for more details. Upon successful connection to the network, the investigator needs to tamper with
the network topology. For this purpose,
weaknesses of several network technologies
can be exploited. From this point on, the investigator can start to capture and break the
encryption on the suspect’s communication.
Specialized tools focused on exploiting individual weaknesses in security mechanisms
currently used by WLAN s are already available. There are also specialized tools focused
on individual steps of MitM attacks. Tools
that were analyzed and used in implementation of the wifimitm package are outlined
in Section 2.
Based on the acquired knowledge, referenced studies and practical experience from
manual experiments, authors were able to
create an attack strategy which is composed
of a suitable set of available tools. The strategy is then able to select and manage individual steps for a successful MitM attack tailored to a specific WLAN configuration. This strategy also includes options for
impersonation and phishing for situations,
when the network is properly secured, and
the weakest part of the overall security is
the suspect.
The created software can perform a fully
automated attack and requires zero knowledge. We tested the implementation on
carefully devised experiments, with available
equipment. The tool is open source and can
be easily incorporated into other software.
The main use cases of this tool are found in
automated penetration testing, forensic investigation, and education.
c 2018 ADFSL
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2. SECURITY
WEAKNESSES IN
WLAN TECHNOLOGIES
Following network technologies (Sections 2.1, 2.2), which find a significant
utilization, unfortunately, suffer from
security weaknesses in their protocols.
These flaws can be used in the process of
the MitM attack.

2.1

Wireless Security

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP ) is a security algorithm introduced as a part of
the IEEE 802.11 standard (Halsall, 2005,
p. 665; IEEE-SA, 2012, pp. 1167–1169). Today, WEP is deprecated and superseded by
subsequent algorithms, but is still sometimes
used, as can be seen from Table 1 available from Wifileaks.cz 2 . Fluhrer, Mantin,
and Shamir (2001) presented that WEP is
broken. There are tools that provide access
to wireless networks secured by WEP available (Tews, Weinmann, & Pyshkin, 2007).
Regarding WEP secured WLAN s, authentication can be either Open System Authentication (OSA) or Shared Key Authentication
(SKA) (IEEE-SA, 2012, pp. 1170–1174). In
the case of WEP OSA, any station (STA)
can successfully authenticate to the Access
Point (AP ) (Robyns, 2014, pp. 4–10). WEP
SKA provides authentication and security of
transferred communication using a shared
key. Confidentiality of transferred data is ensured by encryption using the RC4 stream
cipher. Methods used for cracking access to
WEP secured networks are based on analysis of transferred data with corresponding
Initialization Vectors (IV s).
Wi-Fi Protected Access R (WPATM , a subset of 802.11i) was developed by the Wi-Fi
Alliance R as a reaction to increasing number
of security flaws in WEP. The WPA is de2

http://www.wifileaks.cz/statistika/
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signed to be backward hardware compatible
with devices that used WEP, and vendors
were expected to provide a firmware update
to remedy the catastrophic situation with
WEP. Therefore, for data confidentiality and
integrity was chosen Temporal Key Integrity
Protocol (TKIP ). The main flaw of WPA security algorithm is associated with the TKIP
and a four-way handshake. It can be identified at the beginning of client device’s communication, where an unsecured exchange of
confidential information is performed during
the handshake. An investigator can obtain
this unsecured communication and use it for
consecutive cracking of the Pairwise Master
Key (PMK ) that is derived from Pre-Shared
Key (PSK ) or negotiated using an 802.1x
authentication stage in case of enterprise authentication.
Wi-Fi Protected Access R 2 (WPA2TM ,
full implementation of 802.11i) is a successor of WPA, but security flaws of
the WPA algorithm remain significant also
for the WPA2.
Besides TKIP, WPA2
has mandatory support of Counter Mode
CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP ). Both TKIP
and CCMP ensure data confidentiality, authentication, and access control.
IEEE
802.11ad adds and 802.11ac extends a
new confidentiality protocol Galois/Counter
Mode Protocol (GCMP ). Information exposed during the handshake can be once
again used for the dictionary attack, which
can be further improved by precomputing
the PMKs (Kumkar, Tiwari, Tiwari, Gupta,
& Shrawne, 2012, pp. 37–38; Liu, Jin, &
Wang, 2010, p. 3). Precomputed lookup tables are already available online3 .
A critical security flaw in wireless networks secured by WPA or WPA2 is the functionality called Wi-Fi Protected SetupTM
(WPS ). This technology provides a comfort-

Table 1. Following table summarizes WLAN
statistics provided by Wifileaks.cz. Users of
this service voluntarily scan and publish details about WLAN s in the Czech Republic.
Information in the table show that a significant number of WLAN s still use deprecated
security algorithms. The statistics consisting of 97 192 922 measurements of 2 548 054
WLAN s were published on May 26, 2017.
Security
WPA2
WEP
WPA
open
other

Count
1 429 518
393 579
375 984
67 388
281 585

Ratio
56 %
15 %
15 %
3%
11 %

Table 2. Results of wardriving in Bratislava
and Brno focused on UPC vulnerabilities concerning default WPA2 PSK passwords (Klinec & Svı́tok, 2016b). Detailed
article about these security flaws is available
online (Klinec & Svı́tok, 2016a).
Bratislava,
Slovakia,
2016-10-01
Total networks
UPC networks
Vulnerable
UPC networks
Brno,
Czech Republic,
2016-02-10
Total networks
UPC networks
Vulnerable
UPC networks

Count

Ratio

22 172
3 092

13.95 %

1 327

42.92 % UPC

Count

Ratio

17 516
2 868

16.37 %

1 835

63.98 % UPC

3

https://www.renderlab.net/projects/
WPA-tables/
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Server

Internet

Gateway
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Attacker

Client

Figure 2. In an example network topology suitable for realization of MitM attack, the
attacker’s device acts towards the victim as a default gateway. All the communication routed
outside the local network from the victim is sent to the default gateway, in this case to the
attacker’s device. From the attacker’s device, the communication can be further routed to
the real default gateway (Callegati et al., 2009). For the successful execution of this scenario,
the attacker needs to be connected to the targeted local network.
able and supposedly secure way of connecting to the network. For a connection to
the WLAN with WPS enabled, it is possible
to use an individual PIN. However, the process of connecting to the properly secured
network by providing PIN is very prone
to brute-force attacks (Heffner, 2011). Because WPS is a usual feature in today’s access points and that WPS is usually turned
on by default, WPS can be a very common security flaw even in networks secured
by WPA2 with a strong password. Currently, there are already available automated
tools for exploiting WPS weaknesses, e.g.,
Reaver Open Source 4 .
Recently, a critical vulnerability, Key Reinstallation Attacks (KRACKs), was discovered by Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017 revealing
a flaw in 801.11i and related specifications,
more precisely, in the description of the fourway handshake. A security of CCMP and
GCMP encryption methods expects that no
Initialization Vector (IV ) repeats under the
same key. Authors showed that abusing this
vulnerability, they can reinstall a Pairwise
Transient Key (PTK ) used for generation of
Key Confirmation Key (KCK ), Key Encryption Key (KEK ), and Temporal Key (TK ).

KCK and KEK are used for handshake protection and TK for data encryption. The reinstallation resets the incremental transmit
packet number (nonce) and receiver packet
number (replay counter) to the initial value.
Therefore, the reinstallation violates the expectation of non reusable IV, which consequently breaks TKIP, CCMP or GCMP protocols. As Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017 show,
this also occasionally happens in regular conditions, without an adversary.
Newly purchased access points usually use
WPA2 security by default. Currently, many
access points can be found using default
passwords not only for wireless network access, but even for AP ’s web administration. With access to the AP ’s administration, the investigator could focus on changing the network topology by tampering the
network configuration. Access to the network management further allows the investigator to lower security levels, disable attack
detections, reconfigure DHCP together with
DNS and also clear AP ’s logs. There are
already implemented tools, which exploit relations between SSIDs and default network
passwords, e.g., upc keys 5 by Peter Geissler.6
5

4

https://code.google.com/archive/p/
reaver-wps/
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https://haxx.in/upc-wifi/
UPC company is a major ISP in the Czech Republic, URL: https://www.upc.cz
6
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These tools could be used in an attack on
the network with default SSID to improve
dictionary attack using possible passwords.
High severity of these security flaws is also
proven by the fact that a significant amount
of WLAN s was found using unchanged passwords, as it is shown in Table 2.

2.2

Network Technologies
vulnerable to MitM

Man-in-the-middle attacks are possible because of the very nature of existing network
protocols. No designed for providing security per see, the common network protocols
lack strong authentication capabilities that
would prevent their misuse by an attacker.
Man-in-the-middle attacks assume that the
attacker can divert legitimate communication. Switched Ethernet and secured wireless transmission separates the communication between two endpoints thus no other device should be able to see the conversation.
Fortunately for the attacker, the insecurity
of existing widely deployed protocols can be
used. At the minimum, the following protocols can be considered as suitable targets:
1. DHCP automates network device configuration without a user’s intervention
(Droms, 1997).
2. ARP translates an IPv4 address to a
destination MAC address of the nexthop device in the local area network (Plummer, 1982).
3. IPv6 networks utilize ICMPv6 Neighbor
Discovery functionality to achieve similar functionality to ARP in IPv4 networks.
Because of the lack of authentication and
integrity checking, these protocols are vulnerable to spoofing attacks:
Page 64

1. DHCP Spoofing generates fake DHCP
communication. This attack can also
be referred to as Rogue DHCP. An investigator can perform this kind of attack to provide devices in the network
with malicious configuration, most often a fake default gateway address or
DNS address.
2. ARP Spoofing provides the network devices with fake ARP messages. This
persuades the suspect’s device to believe that the attacking device’s MAC
address is the default gateway’s MAC
address.
3. IPv6 Neighbor Spoofing is a similar concept to ARP Spoofing.
From the available spoofing attacks, the
ARP Spoofing technique was implemented in
our tool. This method proved itself with reasonable performance during experiments and
it is simple to implement.
Of course, there are counter-measures to
spoofing attacks. The defense against spoofing lies in implementing some extra functionality to network devices:
1. DHCP Snooping is a countermeasure
against DHCP Spoofing. This technique
focuses on detection of forged DHCP
communication. Network device acting
as a DHCP snooper accepts only DHCP
messages which are coming from connections to the genuine DHCP server,
others are discarded. This way, individual connections are classified as either
trusted or untrusted. If the network
contains an unknown DHCP server behind an untrusted connection, it is referred to as Spurious DHCP Server
(Cisco Systems, Inc., 2013, p. 54-2).
2. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI ) is
based on analysis of ARP messages
c 2018 ADFSL
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transmitted over the network with aim
to detect ARP Spoofing. Similarly, device performing DAI can have its connections classified as trusted or untrusted. ARP messages from trusted
connections are not checked. Analyzing device maintains a trusted database
of mapping of IP and MAC addresses
in the corresponding LAN. ARP messages from untrusted connections can
be verified against this trusted mapping database (Cisco Systems, Inc.,
2013, p. 56-2).
3. Neighbor Discovery Inspection (NDI )
uses similar approach as abovementioned DAI, but to detect IPv6
Neighbor Spoofing. Analyzing device
verifies information transferred in
Neighbor Discovery messages against
its database of IP and MAC address mappings.
Although the mitigation techniques are
known, they are applied mostly in the enterprise environments. In SOHO networks the
devices either lack this feature or the protection is not enabled by the administrator.

2.3

Man-in-the-Middle Attack

The MitM refers to the situation, where
the attacker’s device is located in the network topology between two participants of
the communication (Figure 2). The attacker
then acts as an intermediary and the network traffic is routed through the attacking device. This state of unauthorized and
intentionally changed network topology enables the attacker to eavesdrop on passed
communication. The attacker is also able to
focus on decryption of data and on changing
the content of passed communication. That
means that the attacker can inject harmful content. The attacker’s prioritized intention is not only to take control over the
c 2018 ADFSL
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traffic but also to perform this attack without anyone noticing it. This way, Man-inthe-Middle Attack is endangers maintaining
confidentiality and integrity, key parts of the
CIA triad.
HTTPS uses asymmetric cryptography
with private and public keys to provide secure HTTP communication. If the victim
is communicating using HTTPS, successful
realization of MitM attack is more difficult. During communication of web browser
on client’s device with a web server, these
two parties exchange a certificate containing a public key for providing a secure data
transfer. MitM attack, in this case, captures transferred certificate and replaces it
with a forged one (Callegati et al., 2009).
The forged certificate is at this point a selfsigned certificate. Upon reception of the
self-signed certificate, victim’s web browser
can show some warning concerning possible risk. If the victim is not aware of the
possible consequences, the victim can accept
the certificate. In the case of success, both
communicating devices are convinced of secured HTTPS communication, but the attacking device has the ongoing communication available.
DNS Spoofing focuses on possibilities
of forging DNS communication used for resolution of domain names and IP addresses.
For the successful realization of this attack,
the attacker needs to detect and intercept
DNS messages in the network. The aim of
this attack is to direct the victim to a different device by providing a fake mapping of inquired domain name to a special IP address.
The attacker is able to imitate the inquired
service by running a similar rogue service on
the provided spoofed IP address. If the victim is convinced that the inquired service is
genuine, the attacker can then focus on capturing confidential information and credentials. The attacker can also use DNS Spoofing for providing the real service, but with
Page 65
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Accessing wireless network
Scan

Crack

Impersonate
(phishing)

Connect

Man-in-the-Middle attack
Capturing network traffic

Tampering network topology

stop

stop

Figure 3. During the first phase – Accessing wireless network, the tool is capable of an attack on WEP OSA, WEP SKA, WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK secured WLAN s. In a case of
the dictionary attack on the device deployed by the UPC company, used dictionaries are personalized by the implicit passwords. In the case of properly secured WLAN, impersonation
(phishing) can be employed. Using this method, an investigator impersonates the legitimate
network to obtain the WLAN credentials from the user. During the second phase – Tampering network topology, the tool needs to continuously work on keeping the network stations
(STAs) persuaded that the spoofed topology is the correct one. An investigator is now able
to capture or modify the traffic. The successful MitM attack is established.
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enclosed harmful content. DNS Spoofing can
be effectively applied for spoofing fake websites (Prowell et al., 2010, p. 112). If the
attacker detects a DNS message, he intercepts it and forges a reply for the victim.
The victim receives forged mapping of domain name to IP address and starts communication with the fake device without noticing the attack. The attacker then acts as
the inquired service and therefore performs
a MitM attack.

2.4

Available Tools for
Specific Phases of the
MitM Attack on
Wireless Networks

From perspective of the intended functionality of the implemented tool, the whole process of MitM attack on wireless networks
can be divided into three main phases: Accessing wireless network, Tampering network
topology and Capturing network traffic, as
explained in Figure 3.
To access secured wireless networks,
Aircrack-ng suite 7 is considered a reliable
software solution. Considering the phase Accessing wireless network (Figure 3), following tools were utilized. Airmon-ng can manage modes of a wireless interface. Airodumpng can be used to scan and detect attacked
AP. Aircrack-ng together with aireplay-ng,
airodump-ng and upc keys can be utilized for
cracking WEP OSA, WEP SKA, WPA PSK
and WPA2 PSK. The tool wifiphisher 8 can
be used to perform impersonation and phishing. Connection to the wireless network can
be established by netctl 9 .
MITMf 10 with its Spoof plugin can be
used during the Tampering network topology
7

http://www.aircrack-ng.org/
https://github.com/sophron/wifiphisher
9
https://www.archlinux.org/packages/
core/any/netctl/
10
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/MITMf
8
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phase. For the realization of DNS Spoofing,
it is possible to use tool dnsspoof, which is
a part of dsniff collection (Song, 2001). This
collection of network auditing and penetration testing tools contains several advanced
programs, which could be used for tampering network topology.
Capturing traffic can be done by the tool
dumpcap 11 , which is part of the Wireshark 12
distribution. Behaviour, usage and success
rate of individual tools, as well as possibilities of controlling them by the implemented
tool, were analyzed. The software selected
for individual tasks of the automated MitM
attack were chosen from the researched variety of available tools based on performed
manual experiments, further described in
the thesis (Vondráček, 2016).

3. ATTACK
AUTOMATION USING
WIFIMITM PACKAGE
AND WIFIMITMCLI
TOOL
The implemented tool is currently intended
to run on Arch Linux 13 , but it could be used
on other platforms which would satisfy specified dependencies. This distribution was
selected because it is very flexible and
lightweight. Python 3.5 was selected as a primary implementation language for the automated tool and Bash was chosen for supporting tasks, e.g., installation of dependencies
on Arch Linux and software wrappers.
The functionality implemented in
the wifimitm package could be directly
incorporated into other software products
based on Python language.
This way
11

https://www.wireshark.org/docs/
man-pages/dumpcap.html
12
https://www.wireshark.org/
13
https://www.archlinux.org/
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wifimitmcli

updatableProcess

Captured
Traffic

Attack Data

capture

model

topology
wep

access
wpa2

Dictionaries

impersonation

common

requirements

Figure 4. This figure shows the basic structure of the developed application. The tool
wifimitmcli uses a functionality offered by the package wifimitm. The package is also able to
manipulate attack data useful for repeated attacks and capture files with intercepted traffic.
Detailed structure of the package is described in section 3.
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No
Needs to
capture PRGA
XOR?
Yes

Start
Fake
Authentication

Repeatedly deauthenticate
stations one by one, until
PRGA XOR is captured.

Stop
All

Start
ARP Replay

Yes

No
Cracked?

Start
WEP PSK
Crack

Check process
and wait.

Figure 5. The figure shows a simplified flowchart of cracking WEP OSA or WEP SKA secured
wireless network. Cracking procedure is a part of the first phase Accessing wireless network
as described in Figure 3. If the given WLAN has already been successfully attacked, Attack
Data (Section 3.1) contains the correct key. In such cases, repetitive cracking is unnecessary
and is therefore skipped.
the package would work as a software
library. Schema of the wifimitm package is
in Figure 4.
The wifimitm package consists of following
modules. The access module offers an automated process of cracking selected WLAN.
It uses modules wep and wpa2, which implement attacks and cracking based on the used
security algorithm. The wep module is capable of fake authentication with the AP,
ARP replay attack (to speed up gathering of IV s) and cracking the key based on
IV s. In the case of WPA2 secured network, the wpa2 module can perform a dictionary attack, personalize used dictionary
and verify a password obtained by phishing (Figure 4). Verification of the password
and dictionary attacks are done with a previously captured handshake. The common
module contains functionality which could
be used in various parts of the process for
c 2018 ADFSL

scanning and capturing wireless communication in monitor mode. The common module also offers a way to deauthenticate STAs
from selected AP.
If a dictionary attack against a correctly
secured network fails, a phishing attack can
be managed by the impersonation14 module. The topology module can be used to
change network topology. It provides functionality for ARP Spoofing. The capture
module focuses on capturing network traffic (Figure 4). It is intended to be used after
the tool is successfully connected to the attacked network and network topology was
successfully changed into the one suitable for
MitM attack.

14

For details concerning individual phishing scenarios, please see wifiphisher ’s website. https://
github.com/sophron/wifiphisher
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No
Needs to capture
handshake?

Yes

Repeatedly deauthenticate
stations one by one, until
handshake is captured.

Personalize
dictionary?

No

Yes

upc_keys

Start
WPA PSK/WPA2 PSK
dictionary attack
Stop
All

Yes

No
Cracked?

Check process
and wait.

Figure 6. This simplified flowchart illustrates cracking WPA PSK or WPA2 PSK secured
network. Similarly as cracking in Figure 5, this procedure is also a part of the first phase
Accessing wireless network (Figure 3). Cracking can also be skipped if the key is already
known. As already described, impersonation (phishing) can be used in a case of unsuccessful
cracking.

3.1

Attack Data

Various attacks executed against the selected
AP require some information to be captured first. ARP request replay attack on
WEP secured networks requires an ARP request to be obtained in order to start an attacking procedure. Fake authentication in
WEP SKA secured network needs PRGA
XOR 15 obtained from a detected authentication. Dictionary attack against WPA PSK
and WPA2 PSK secured networks requires
a captured handshake. Finally, for the successful connection to a network, a correct key
is required. When the required information
is obtained, it can be saved for a later usage to speed up following or repetitive attacks. Data from successful attacks could
be even shared between users of the implemented tool.
15

Stream of Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm generated bits.
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3.2

Dictionary Personalization

Weaknesses in default network passwords
could be exploited to improve dictionary attacks against WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK
security algorithms. The implemented tool
incorporates upc keys for generation of possible default passwords if the selected network matches the criteria. The upc keys tool
generates passwords, which are transferred
to the cracking tool using pipes. With this
approach, the implemented tool could be further improved for example to support localized dictionaries.

3.3

Requirements

The implemented automated tool depends
on several other tools, which are being controlled. The Python package can be automatically installed by its setup including Python dependencies. Non-Python dependencies can be satisfied by installation
c 2018 ADFSL
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ARP Replay

Process just started.

Process has
been terminated.

Waiting for a beacon frame.

Waiting for an ARP request.

Flags
deauthenticated

read
ACKs
ARPs
sent
pps

Files
Got ARP request, sending packets.

replay_arp.cap

Figure 7. This figure presents the information model of a process controlled by wifimitm.
In this example, the incorporated tool is aireplay-ng from Aircrack-ng suite executing ARP
replay attack to speed up gathering of IV s. State of the process is modeled using a FSM
consisting of 5 states. In a case that the attacking device receives at least one deauthentication packet, the deauthenticated flag is set. Statistics contain overall information about
processed packets. Useful file created by aireplay-ng during this procedure is a capture file
containing ARP request. This file is part of the Attack Data, as outlined in Section 3.1.
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Internet

Internet

STA 1
R1

STA 5
R1

STA 2

AP

STA 6

AP

STA 3

STA 1

wifimitm

STA 4

STA 7

wifimitm

STA 8

Figure 8. This figure presents the network
topology used for the first performance testing (Section 4.1) and success rate measurements (Section 4.2). Results of this performance testing are in Figure 10.

Figure 9. This figure shows the network
topology consisting of 8 STAs and 1 AP
which was used for the second performance
testing (Section 4.1). Results of this performance testing are in Figure 11.

scripts and wrappers, which are currently developed for Arch Linux.
MITMf has a number of dependencies.
Therefore, the installation script also creates a virtual environment dedicated to
MITMf. After installation, MITMf can be
easily run encapsulated in its environment.
Wifiphisher is also installed in a virtualized environment and run using a wrapper. Tool upc keys is compiled during installation. Some changes in wifiphisher ’s
source code were implemented, the installation script therefore applies a software patch.
Other software dependencies are installed
using a package manager.
Due to the nature of concrete steps of
the attack, a special hardware equipment
is required. During the scanning and cap-

turing of network traffic without being connected to the network, an attacking device
needs a wireless network interface in monitor
mode. For sending forged packets, the wireless network interface also needs to be capable of packet injection. To be able to
perform a phishing attack, a second wireless interface capable of master (AP ) mode
has to be available. The user can check
whether his hardware is capable of packet
injection using the aireplay-ng tool. Managing monitor mode of interface is possible
with the airmon-ng tool.
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3.4

Incorporation of tools

The implemented tool needs to interact with
other software tools in order to automate
attack procedures. Incorporated tools comc 2018 ADFSL
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municate using Standard output stream (stdout), Standard error stream (stderr ) and
optionally using generated files. Wifimitm
needs to continuously analyze all these outputs to be aware of current state of the
controlled tool. Information contained in
the output can be a summary of current
progress, a notification that some event occurred or a result of an intended action.
To meet requirements for efficient incorporation of other tools so that the wifimitm
package could interact with them, the updatableProcess module was developed. This
module contains an abstract base class
UpdatableProcess. Individual incorporated
tools have dedicated classes inherited from
the UpdatableProcess which are used for
managing these tools from wifimitm. When
a process is spawned, using an instance of
class inherited from UpdatableProcess, it is
assigned a temporary directory for its outputs. The running process is continuously
writing to stdout and stderr. The outputs
are periodically analyzed. Classes inherited
from UpdatableProcess can implement a signalization of process’ state using a Finite
State Machine (FSM ). Process’ output can
include notifications of events. Upon detection of such event, appropriate flags can be
set. Some processes also output summary
information, which can be used to update
statistics. Continuously updated information about the process can therefore consist
of state, flags, statistics and created files as
presented in Figure 7.

4.

EVALUATION

The capabilities of the implemented tool
were evaluated. Because the tool deploys
man-in-the-middle type of attack, the tool
necessary modifies the target environment.
Thus we evaluated the footprint of the tool
and the possibility to detect the running attack by the victim. The next set of experic 2018 ADFSL
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ments were conducted to show how easy it is
to gain the network communication for different wireless configurations.

4.1

Attack’s Performance
Impact

The first experiment examines wheathe the
attack is observable from end-user perspective or disrupts regular communication on
the network. A scheme of the networks
used for this experiment is shown in Figures 8 and 9, modeling SOHO16 environment. The STAs were correctly connected to
the AP, and they were successfully communicating with the Internet. The implemented
wifimitmcli tool was then started and automatically attacked the network, as described
in Section 3 and Figure 3.
The performance impact of the wifimitm
was compared using typologies presented in
Figures 8 and 9. As the observed metric was
selected a Round-Trip Time (RTT ) value
describing a delay that end-user might experience when the load on the R1 is increased.
For the first case, only one client is connected at the time. The Figure 10 plots
RTT values measured between STA1 and
its Internet gateway R1. The x axe denotes each measurement, and on the y axe is
shown corresponding delay in ms in a logarithmic scale.
The second case shows eight STAs connected to R1 simultaneously, in Figure 9.
Figure 11 shows an increase of RTT measured between each of STAx and R1.
Both cases were evaluated on the fact,
whether the attack being performed was revealed or whether the users had any suspicion about the malicious transformation of
their WLAN. By results comparison of both
test cases, presented in Figures 10 and 11,
can be concluded that regular user has no
way of knowing whether the increase of la16

small office/home office
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RTT STA1 – R1

RTT STA1 – R1

10000 ms

10000 ms

1000 ms

1000 ms

100 ms

100 ms

10 ms

10 ms

1 ms

1 ms
0

200

usual communication

400

0
MitM

Figure 10. The first WLAN for performance testing was the same as for the success rate measurements described in Section 4.2.
Figure shows comparison of
the measured RTT between STA1 and R1
during usual communication and during
successful MitM attack. The results show
the performance impact is not critical. Discussion with the users of the attacked network proved this attack unrecognizable.
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200

usual communication

400
MitM

Figure 11. The second performance testing
consisted of 8 STAs and 1 AP connected
to the Internet – streaming videos, downloading large files, etc. The figure compares the RTT between STA1 and R1 similarly. The performance impact is more severe than in Figure 10. Despite the performance impact, the users had no suspicion
that they were under MitM attack. Instead, they blamed the amount of devices
for network congestion.
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tency is caused by an attack, or by a new
device connecting to the network, massive
data transfer, or any other interference from
the physical world.
On the other hand, there is apparent linear segregation between measurements with
and without attack in Figure 11. This observation submits a future challenge, whether
this condition might be used as a feature for
a wireless network diagnostic without direct
access to R1 or any of STAs.

4.2

Experiments Concerning
Various Network Devices
and Configurations

The second experiment observes applicability of the wifimitmcli tool in different SOHO
environments based on multiple AP devices
with a variety of commonly used security
settings in combination with numerous enduser devices. The experiment was considered
successful if the wifimitmcli was able to perform all phases of MitM attack, Figure 3,
and place itself in the middle of communication to capture network traffic according to
the concept of MitM, Section 2.3 and Figure 2. For the test case to be correct, no
help from the investigator was allowed during the attack performed by wifimitmcli.
The first use-case was to test all combinations of available AP devices with all available client ones. Figure 8 shows network
topology used in this controlled laboratory
experiment. Results of the success rate measurements are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The second use-case was to test success rate of the wifimitmcli tool in a nonlaboratory environment beyond our control
on the end-user part. Figure 8 shows once
again testing topology withLinksys WRP400
device as an AP. Table 4 shows measurements and success rate of observations of this
use-case. The experiment was conducted
during the author’s presentation at the Brno
c 2018 ADFSL
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University of Technology, Faculty of Information Technology where visitors were invited to let their devices be attacked.
Results of experiments present in Tables 3, 4 and the thesis (Vondráček, 2016,
pp. 42–43) reveal the following conclusions:
• Open – networks can be very easily attacked.
• WEP OSA and WEP SKA – secured
networks can be successfully attacked
even if they use a random password.
• WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK – secured
networks suffer from weak passwords
(dictionary attack), default passwords
and mistakes of users (impersonation
and phishing).
Consequently, results reveal feasibility
and ease of MitM attack using the wifimitm, and its success rate in the target
SOHO environments.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this research was to implement
a tool that would be able to automate all
the necessary steps to perform MitM attacks
on WLAN s. The authors searched for and
analyzed a range of software and methods
focused on penetration testing, communication sniffing and spoofing, password cracking and hacking in general. To be able to
design, implement and test the tool capable of such attacks, knowledge of different
widespread security approaches was essential. The authors further focused on possibilities of MitM attacks even in cases where the
target WLAN is secured correctly. Therefore, methods and tools for impersonation
and phishing were also analyzed.
The authors’ work and research resulted
in creation of the wifimitm Python package.
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Table 3. This table presents results of the success rate measurements. A successful attack is
marked using a checkmark symbol (X) and unsuccessful attack is marked using a times symbol (×). In the case when the attack was not fully successful, the question mark (?) is used.
Such partially successful test (? symbol) can for example happen in situation where the suspect is sending only a portion of his traffic through the investigator. Some of the used STAs
lack WEP SKA settings ( symbol). Testing WPA PSK and WPA2 PSK networks were
configured with password ”12345678” and WEP secured networks used password ”A b#1”.

Linksys
WRT610N

Linksys
WRT54G

Linksys
WRP400

TP-LINK
TL-WR841N

D-Link
DVA-G3671B
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open
WEP OSA
WEP SKA
WPA PSK
WPA2 PSK
open
WEP OSA
WEP SKA
WPA PSK
WPA2 PSK
open
WEP OSA
WEP SKA
WPA PSK
WPA2 PSK
open
WEP OSA
WEP SKA
WPA PSK
WPA2 PSK
open
WEP OSA
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WPA PSK
WPA2 PSK

X
X

X
X
X
X
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X
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X
X
X
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X
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Table 4. The following table shows the results of public experiments. Testing network
utilized Linksys WRP400 as an AP and enduser devices of random people that agreed
to participate in the experiment. A successful attack is marked using a checkmark symbol (X).
Model
HTC Desire 500
HTC Desire 820
Apple iPhone 6
Apple iPhone 5s
Apple iPhone 5
Apple iPhone 5c
Apple iPhone 4

OS
Android 4.1.2
Android 6.0.1
iOS 10.3.1
iOS 10.2.1
iOS 10.3.1
iOS 9.2.1
iOS 7.1.2

Attack
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

This package serves as a library which provides functionality for automation of MitM
attacks on target WLAN s. The developed
package can also be easily incorporated into
other tools. Another product of this research is the wifimitmcli tool which incorporates the functionality of the wifimitm
package. This tool automates the individual steps of a MitM attack and can be
used from a CLI. The implemented software
comes with a range of additions for convenient usage, e.g., a script that checks and installs dependencies on Arch Linux, a Python
setuptools setup script and of course a manual page.
The wifimitmcli tool, and therefore wifimitm as well, was tested during experiments
with an available set of equipment. As
the results show, the implemented software
product is able to perform an automated
MitM attack on WLAN s successfully.
Upon successful deployment and execution of the implemented tool, an investigator
can eavesdrop or spoof the passing communication. The goal of the tool was to automate
MitM attacks on PSK secured WLANs. It
does not focus on dissecting further traffic
c 2018 ADFSL
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protections. This means that it does not
interfere with SSL/TLS, VPN, or other encapsulations. Thanks to the tool’s design, it
can be easily used together with other software specialized on interception of encapsulated traffic. Traffic encapsulation is a sufficient protection against this tool. From
the WLAN administrators point of view,
available defense mechanisms are outlined
in Section 2.2.
As explained earlier, all the suspect’s network traffic is passing through the attacking
device during a successful MitM attack. Unfortunately, there could be users on the network other than the ones that are subject
to a court order. Making sure that only appropriate traffic is being captured may be
important depending on the nature of the
court order or the legislation. This challenge
may be solved by setting corresponding filter
rules for traffic capture software.
This research and its products can be utilized in combination with other security research carried out at the Brno University
of Technology, Faculty of Information Technology. It can serve in investigations done
by forensic researchers (Pluskal et al., 2015).
It can also be used in automated penetration
testing of WLANs.
In the future iterations of the development, the product could focus on exploiting the weaknesses of the widely used WPS
technology, incorporating techniques to perform KRACKs, or focus on detection of attacks themselves. Concerning the current
state of the product, it does not focus on
enterprise WLAN s, which also suffer from
their weaknesses.
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